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The Certiorari Clinic at Northeastern University School of Law provides
students the opportunity to do useful work in death penalty cases in an abbreviated
time frame (an academic quarter) by focusing on a single step present in virtually
every case-the petition to the United States Supreme Court for a grant of
certiorari. Over the past decade, students have prepared petitions in more than one
hundred capital cases from a dozen different states. This Commentary explains
how this enterprise is organized and why it is worthwhile. I also report upon what
a decade of wide but shallow exposure to capital cases reveals in terms of the
evidence and advocacy necessary to secure a conviction and death sentence. Death
cases are consistently, if infrequently, pursued and won on the basis of evidence
that should, but apparently does not, create more than a lingering doubt about guilt.
When it comes to the evidence necessary for conviction and sentence, death is not
different.
I. THE CLINIC DESCRIBED
The organization of the clinic is simplicity itself. I am the "faculty" and the
instruction occurs in my office, although the files and student work space are
located in the law school clinic. Interested students identify themselves four to six
weeks before the start of an academic quarter by submitting some form of legal
writing prepared after the first year demonstrating basic proficiency in research,
analysis and exposition. I then look for cases (two students to a case) by
contacting capital resource offices in various states. Over the years, the cases have
come from twelve different states beginning with Texas, but currently North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Alabama provide the largest number. Other than that
the petition be due no less than six weeks after the beginning of the academic
quarter, there are no requirements in terms of the kind of cases or the quality of
issue that we will undertake. Perhaps one should strive to insure that students
work on cases presenting well-developed, intellectually challenging issues.
However, these selection criteria are neither realistic, given the time constraints
described below, nor responsive to what the resource centers are seeking when
they want someone to do a certiorari petition. They also trade off one kind of
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educational experience (writing a legal argument based upon a rich record with
well-developed issues) for another (creating a respectable legal argument out of a
sparse record with poorly developed federal issues) that might be equally or even
more valuable for anyone who wants either to understand capital litigation or to
prepare for doing it.
Unless the circuit justice grants an extension, certiorari petitions must be filed
within ninety days of the final judgment of the highest state court with jurisdiction.
Ninety days is also the length of an academic quarter. Since the clinic's work has
to begin immediately with the start of the quarter, the lawyers involved must agree
that the case will be ours as of the start of the quarter. They can only make this
commitment with respect to cases which have already been decided and as to
which the clock has begun to tick. Thus, virtually all the cases come to the clinic
with fewer than ninety days remaining to file a petition, and in some cases it may
be as few as forty-five days or even less.
After an initial organizational meeting, students are divided into teams and the
cases assigned. From that point until the petition is filed, all instruction takes the
form of meeting with each pair of students and working with them to produce a
credible certiorari petition. This translates into an initial meeting to discuss the
case and what they should be looking for in terms of issues to present in a petition,
a second meeting at which we identify the issues they are going to pursue, and a
series of meetings-between five and eight, depending on the case and the
students-at which I review drafts of arguments and eventually drafts of the
petition. The students work with the briefs and record (particularly the trial
transcript) developed at trial and on appeal. A typical petition goes through four to
five drafts, each of which I review, comment upon, and discuss with the students.
There is no classroom component. When the clinic first began, I included
such a component but soon learned that it was difficult to do anything useful in
that setting either in terms of examining issues relating to the death penalty or
criminal procedure, or in terms of skill enhancement. There tends to be no overlap
of the issues that seem worthy of a certiorari petition among the cases we handle in
a given quarter. Indeed, there is no guarantee that whatever constitutional issues
exist will have anything to do with capital punishment per se. Moreover, the
classroom component was not effective because each case was on its own schedule
so that students were at very different places at any point in the quarter in terms of
what they were doing. Finally, I believe that there is great education in the doing
and that many people learn best by working on a concrete task. Putting all my
energy into working with the students on specific petitions conforms to my
pedagogical predilections (not to mention those of my institution).' Someone who
is committed to collective reflection could enhance the experience through the
addition of a classroom component, although the practical problems noted above
would remain.
I Daniel Givelber et al., Learning Through Work, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1995).
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The typical petition is between twenty-five and thirty-five pages in length,
although a few are longer. It depends upon the issues and what there is to say
about them. Length has little to do with difficulty. The most challenging petitions
are those in cases in which the trial and appellate lawyers abjure extensive
(occasionally any) discussion of the United States Constitution and decisions of
federal or state courts interpreting it. State appellate courts do not go out of their
way to identify and decide federal issues when the parties do not raise them, yet a
certiorari petition can only ask for a review of state decisions concerning federal
law. This means that the students either have to identify the traces of federal
constitutional doctrine in the state authorities which are presented and discussed, or
identify federal issues that were raised in the proceedings before, at, or after trial
and demonstrate why, under state law, these were necessarily resolved by the
opinion affirming the conviction on appeal. Not infrequently, drafting the section
of the petition entitled "How the Federal Issues Were Raised and Resolved Below"
is as challenging as drafting the core of the petition-the "Reasons Why the
Petition Should Be Granted."
Each student typically takes responsibility for one argument, so that the
petition presents two questions to the Court. This is an area where the pedagogical
needs (each student should have her own issue to develop) may appear to be in
tension with the accepted wisdom concerning effective advocacy-presenting a
single strong argument stands a greater chance of securing the Court's attention
than the presentation of multiple, unconnected arguments. The tension actually
presents itself rarely (there are not that many capital cases presenting fresh
constitutional challenges that received significant treatment by the state's highest
court), and on those occasions the students do work on the same issue.
Why do this? Not because you fantasize about securing a grant and arguing a
case before the Supreme Court. Certiorari grants may not be entirely predictable,
but they are not random events either. It would take a desperate lawyer at a
resource center to decide knowingly to turn over to students a case presenting
likely issues. And the Court does not typically reach to decide issues that have
escaped the notice of the state supreme court.
My reasons fall into three categories. First, preparing a petition can be a
terrific educational experience for students in terms of developing research,
advocacy, and writing skills. The time limits, combined with the requirement that
the issue is one that was necessarily decided below, mean that students can and do
complete the task in its entirety even within an eleven-week academic quarter.
They have the satisfaction of doing a single piece of a very lengthy and complex
litigation in its entirety. It can also be a revealing introduction to our system of
capital punishment through the lens of a single case involving (frequently) a
defendant with somewhat marginal intellectual and psychological capabilities who
has been found guilty of a brutal and senseless crime and been represented by a
lawyer who may have lacked the resources (occasionally in every sense of that
word) to develop an effective argument against the imposition of the death penalty.
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Second, the students receive this introduction by doing work that must be
done2 in order to permit the orderly development of the defendant's post-
conviction claims. While the essential need is that the petition be timely filed,
frequently the work has greater significance than simply tolling the statute of
limitations: a petition may represent the first time that an issue which is present in
the case receives either recognition or (more likely) a relatively comprehensive
treatment including an analysis of different courts' approaches to the problem.
Additionally (and for the instructor's peace of mind, essentially), preparing a
certiorari petition does not carry with it the risk that haunts all other work in a
capital case-the possibility that failing to identify and raise a particular claim
forfeits that claim in all subsequent proceedings.
Third, the clinic provides the instructor with a broad exposure to the issues
currently being litigated in capital cases. It is one way (albeit hardly the most
complete or practical) to "keep up with the advance sheets." As the next section
suggests, exposure to this range of cases over a substantial period of time may also
provide a sense of what transpires in the ordinary capital case. It is either a curse
or a blessing of the academic life that our typical exposure is to the unusual
judicial decision or proceeding. Depending on one's view, running a certiorari
clinic is either an antidote to the curse or a tarnishing of the blessing.
A certiorari clinic may appear to be death penalty "lite" because the students
enter and leave the process at a relatively early point (following appellate
affirmance on direct appeal). They are not present and participating when the final
habeas petition is filed or the commutation hearing begins or the last meal is
served. In terms of adrenaline rush, filing a certiorari petition is simply a non-
starter compared to racing to the courthouse to file a second habeas at the eleventh
hour. Having worked with a very large number of students on a single case that
consumed eleven years and involved all these steps (save the very last meal), my
impression is that students overall are more likely to gain more substantive
knowledge, experience a greater improvement in their skills, and feel a greater
sense of accomplishment from participating in the certiorari clinic than by
participating at any but the most exciting moments of the single case.
All death penalty litigation proceeds in the shadow of a ticking clock. While
supervising the preparation of a certiorari petition is far less anxiety-producing
than overseeing the filing of a second habeas petition, the stakes are still high.
Depending upon whether an extension has been granted and for how long, failure
to file in a timely manner can literally waste up to five of the twelve months
available to a capital defendant to file a federal habeas petition. In a world in
which it can take months to recruit lawyers willing to do post-conviction
representation, this is unacceptable. The Court rules do not permit requests for
2 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000) requires a petitioner to file a federal habeas corpus
petition within a year of the conclusion of the direct appeal in state court. The denial of a petition for
certiorari concludes direct appeal and begins the running of the one year statute of limitation. United
States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002).
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extensions of the time unless made ten or more days before the due date. The
vagaries of student ability and effort, illness, computer functionality, and weather
will remind anyone undertaking this task what it means to be a practicing lawyer.
II. WHAT THE CLINIC CASES REVEAL: CAPITAL CASES AND GUILT
Sam Gross has argued that erroneous convictions are likely in capital cases,3
and the clinic cases suggest that he is correct. Many people are sent to their death
on less than overwhelming evidence of guilt. While "residual doubt" about guilt
may lead some jurors to vote for life,4 the certiorari cases from our clinic
demonstrate either that jurors may not have doubts when such doubts would be
appropriate or that jurors find it within themselves to rise above such doubts and
vote for death.
Two features of the certiorari cases stand out: (a) the state's repeated reliance
upon statements by the defendant to the police, co-defendants, and acquaintances
as the primary evidence of guilt; and (b) the state's infrequent but disturbing
willingness to seek and succeed in securing a death sentence in cases with a very
weak evidentiary foundation. While these cases are awash in inculpatory
statements attributed to the defendant, they are surprisingly light on eyewitness
testimony, which is typically identified as the major source of erroneous
convictions. These observations rest on a review of the clinic's files in the eighty-
one cases in which we filed certiorari petitions through the summer of 2003.
Half of the certiorari cases involve incriminating statements by the defendant
to the police, and one-third of them involve testimony that the defendant made
incriminating statements to third parties. One-ninth of the cases involved both
incriminating statements to the police and to third parties. Overall, there was a
confession or statement to a third party in fifty-five of the eighty-one cases (68%).
In nineteen cases (23%) a co-conspirator testified against the defendant: in eight of
these cases this testimony was unaccompanied by any testimony as to an
incriminating statement made by the defendant. Altogether in sixty-three of
eighty-one capital cases (78%), the state relied, at least in part, on either the
defendant's confession or incriminating statements made by the defendant to third
parties or the testimony of a co-defendant, in order to convict the defendant.
The identity of the victim seemed to affect reliance on such evidence. Either
singly or in combination, co-conspirator testimony, confessions, and incriminating
3 See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996). Professor Gross thoroughly and persuasively canvasses
the reasons for erroneous convictions. Among other factors, he points to the far higher clearance rate
(through arrest) in homicide cases than in other crimes and the inevitable evidentiary difficulties
created by the inability of the victim to testify, which together results in the prosecution of more
marginal cases and the use of questionable sources of evidence-such as jail house snitches. See also
Richard Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61 (2003).
4 Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal
Code's Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41 (2001).
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statements to third parties appear in thirty-two out of the thirty-six cases (89%) in
which the deceased was a stranger to the accused, and in seven out of the seven
cases (100%) in which the deceased was a police officer or security guard. These
figures concerning admissions are reminiscent of police and prosecutorial practices
at the time Miranda5 was decided. Frank Hogan, then District Attorney of New
York County, indicated that of the ninety-one homicide prosecutions pending in
New York County as of December 1965, the state intended to introduce
confessions in sixty-two of them (68%).6 Other studies stimulated by the Miranda
decision reported confessions as part of the evidence in the range of 14% to 43%
of the time.7 A more contemporary inquiry reports a rate of confessions in capital
cases that appears consistent with the contemporary use of confessions overall, but
a bit lower than the experience in the clinic. Scott Sundby's study of thirty-seven
convictions in California capital cases found that confessions had been introduced
in twelve of the cases (32%).'
The quality of the evidence, as well as its character, is also striking. In a
number of cases (a little more than 10% of the eighty-one examined) the evidence
of guilt referenced on appeal is either less overwhelming than or, at most, the
equivalent of that presented in cases in which death sentences were followed by
DNA exonerations. 9 Three of the certiorari cases involved murders occurring at
least fourteen years prior to trial where the principal evidence against the accused
was the testimony of witnesses that the defendant had admitted the crime to
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 Steven Roberts, Confessions Held Crucial By Hogan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1965, § 1, at 1.
7 NATHAN R. SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSIONS STANDARDS: MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 141-43
(1966) (overall confession rate of 14%, ranging from 24% in homicide cases to 10% in robbery
cases); Michael Wald et al., Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519,
1580 tbl.F-3 (1967) (confessions employed in 19% of cases); Evelle J. Younger, Interrogation of
Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 255, 255-56, 261
(1966) (confessions admitted in 33% to 37% of prosecutions); James Witt, Non-Coercive
Interrogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police
Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320, 325, 329 tbl.8 (1973) (although police questioning
was successful in 67% to 69% of cases, a confession or admission was introduced in only 43% of
prosecutions).
8 Scott E. Sundby, Capital Jury andAbsolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse
and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1557, 1584 (1998). The considerably higher rate in the
certiorari cases includes any statements made by the accused to the police which were offered by the
prosecution as evidence of the defendant's guilt whereas Sundby's study may have been limited to
instances in which the defendants admitted their guilt of homicide to the police.
9 The exonerated defendants who had been sentenced to death include: Ray Krone (Arizona),
Frank Lee Smith (Florida), Charles Fain (Idaho), Dennis Williams, Vermeal Jimerson, Ronald Jones,
Alejandro Hernandez, Rolando Cruz (all from Illinois), Ryan Matthews (Louisiana), Kirk
Bloodsworth (Maryland), Ron Williamson (Oklahoma), Nicholas Yarris (Pennsylvania) and Earl
Washington (Virginia). The Innocence Project: Case Profiles, http://innocenceproject.org/case/
displaycases.php?sort-last name (last visited March 3, 2005).
206 [Vol 3:201
IMPRESSIONS OF ROUTINE CAPITAL CASES
them;1° in a fourth case the murder had occurred nine years earlier, and the main
evidence was again statements made to others admitting guilt (as well as a
conviction for sexual assault in the area in question around the time of the
murder). 1 In two other cases the defendant was convicted based upon the
testimony of a co-defendant against whom all charges were dropped.' 2 Another
certiorari clinic defendant was convicted and sentenced to die on evidence that
eyeglasses identified as his were found at the scene of the crime, that he asked his
mother for an alibi for the time of the crime, and asked his girlfriend whether an
individual could be traced through his eyeglasses. 13  Another death sentence
resulted from a conviction based upon evidence that the defendant was one of two
people who was with the victim on the night in question and that he (an African
American) had previously abused three white women (the victim was white).' 4 A
Pennsylvania defendant was convicted and sentenced to die after two hung verdicts
based on the evidence of an eyewitness who testified he knew the defendant by his
first name and another witness who said that he saw the defendant with a gun of
the make used in the robbery (the gun was never recovered).' 5 A Mississippi jury
convicted and sentenced a defendant to death on evidence that blood was found on
the three-year-old victim, that he was the last person seen with the victim, and had
a forty-minute window in which to commit the crime, and that the nineteen bite
marks on the victim's body matched dental impressions of the defendant.16
Two of the defendants whose certiorari petitions were unsuccessful have
secured subsequent relief on innocence-related grounds. Alan Gell was acquitted
following a retrial granted because the State had failed to disclose favorable
evidence (that one of his accusers may have been lying and that Gell was probably
in jail or out of state the day the killing actually occurred). 17 Kennedy Brewer,
who had been convicted on the basis of dental testimony concerning bite marks,
won a new trial when DNA tests showed that the blood and sperm on the victim
was not his. 18 I have no basis for asserting that the defendants in the other cases
10 Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 776 A.2d
958 (Pa. 2001); Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1994).
11 Commonwealth v. May, 656 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1995).
12 Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Gell, 524 S.E.2d 332
(N.C. 2000).
13 Commonwealth v. Pursell, 495 A.2d 183 (Pa. 1985).
14 Commonwealth v. Elliott, 700 A.2d 1243 (Pa. 1997).
15 Commonwealth v. Harris, 703 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1997).
16 Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1998).
17 Estes Thompson, N.C. man acquitted of murder-Gel spent nearly a decade on death row,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 2004, http://www.truthinjustice.org/Alan-Gell.htm (last visited
March 2, 2005).
18 Brewer v. State, 819 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 2002) (ordering remand for evidentiary hearing);
Jimmie E. Gates, Accused Killer's Retrial Pending: 2 Years After Favorable DNA Test, Inmate, 33,
In Limbo, CLARION LEDGER, Jan. 2, 2005, at 1.
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discussed above are innocent. But it would not be shocking to learn that some of
them were, given the quality of evidence against them. And these are randomly
assigned, run-of-the-mill cases from a number of jurisdictions-they are likely
representative of many others. Given the nearly 3500 people on death row, it is a
fair guess that those whose conviction and sentence rest upon comparable evidence
is well into the hundreds.
The effort to reform capital punishment over the past two centuries-to
reserve it for the "truly deserving"--has proceeded on two tracks: limiting the
kinds of crimes for which capital punishment is a possible penalty and expanding
the ability of the sentencer to choose life over death. Well intentioned as these
reforms may have been, they have never succeeded in the ultimate goal of
reserving capital punishment exclusively for the most deserving, assuming we
agreed upon who that was. 19 However conscientiously reforms may have been
fashioned and applied initially, the repulsive nature of homicide, the challenges of
proof, and the inability of doctrine to anticipate the variegated nature of human
violence inevitably combined to push prosecutors and courts to expand the reach of
the capital sentence. The certiorari cases confirm these pressures are at work
again. With the exception of the individual who kills one other person efficiently
out of personal enmity or in a sudden rage, the certiorari cases indicate that
virtually any killer who could have received death prior to Funnan20 can and
sometimes does receive death today. They also indicate that the evidence required
to convict and produce a death sentence is no more impressive than that deemed
sufficient in the days when Justice Stewart described receiving the death penalty as
being about as predictable as "being struck by lightning.",2' It was probably
hyperbole then, and, in fairness, today, but it remains a more accurate description
of our current process than the claim that we have succeeded in reserving capital
punishment for the indisputably guilty who are most deserving of death.
19 Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375 (1994).
20 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding death penalty unconstitutional under
sentencing method then in use).
21 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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